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The jury watches the flat panel monitors affixed in the jury box to learn why they
should find for the plaintiff. As part of the closing argument of a tort case, the
plaintiff prepared a power-point presentation, which appears on the jury’s monitors
through the court’s Digital Evidence Presentation System [hereinafter DEPS].1 The
defendant, a police officer, had testified during the trial that he followed the speed
limit during the chase, driving at approximately thirty-five miles per hour.
Nevertheless, the presentation combines excerpts of expert testimony and a map of
the terrain to show, frame by frame, that he covered about 1.2 miles in sixty-nine
seconds – revealing that he was traveling at sixty-four miles per hour.
Long after the trial is over, this power-point presentation continues in use –
playing over and over again in Akron Courtroom 575 of the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio. As part of a pilot program for introducing
new technology into the courtroom, the Northern District of Ohio regularly trains
lawyers on the equipment before they appear in court. The above presentation is just
one of many demonstrations used to show lawyers how they can make use of the
Electronic Courtroom. Practitioners are also taught how to impeach witnesses via a
document camera that simultaneously projects an image of the deposition to the
witness, the judge, the jurors and opposing counsel; how to display three1

“The DEPS allows counsel to switch from displaying exhibits, realtime transcripts, video
recording or multi-media presentations with the push of a button.” CHIEF JUDGE PAUL R.
MATIA, THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO ANNOUNCED
ELECTRONIC COURTROOMS AT ITS U.S. COURT HOUSES (pamphlet n.d.) [hereinafter Pamphlet].
See generally; Section II.
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dimensional objects via this same document camera; how to video-conference with a
witness that is unable to travel to court; and how to electronically mark on
documents with one’s fingertip.
The Northern District of Ohio is a leader in a sweeping trend to employ
technology in the courtroom, with seven of its eighteen active district and magistrate
judges presiding over Electronic Courtrooms.2 As technology races ahead, the
Federal Rules of Evidence lag behind, giving judges little guidance in how to handle
technological evidentiary issues: “The Federal Rules of Evidence offer only the
broadest guidance with respect to the new methods and techniques brought to the
courts along with new technology.”3 The Federal Judicial Center and the National
Institute for Trial Advocacy have published a guide for federal district judges, that
explains how the technology functions and gives comprehensive suggestions about
how judges ought to rule on various objections to the technology.4 A judge’s guide
to courtroom technology notes: “As the use of illustrative aids grew enormously, the
rules remained focused on evidence, not illustrative aids, and the use of the new
technology remained committed to the court’s broad discretion.”5
This Note will explore the evidentiary issues raised by the Electronic Courtroom,
state how they are presently handled, and highlight the need for the adaptation of the
Rules to allow for the smooth integration of such technology into the courtroom.
Part I explains why the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts began funding
Electronic Courtrooms and how they have grown in numbers. Part II gives details
about the type of equipment typically employed in the Electronic Courtroom, using
Courtroom 575 as a case study. The observable impacts of technology on a trial also
will be noted. Part III contains an empirical analysis of evidentiary issues commonly
raised in Electronic Courtrooms and their standard treatment under the Federal Rules
of Evidence. Finally, Part IV discusses the growing discretionary area of illustrative
aids, on the rise due to courtroom technology, and the need for new evidentiary
procedures to adapt to the technology.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE ELECTRONIC COURTROOM
In response to increasing caseloads, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
launched a pilot program in 1998 to publicly fund advanced technology for selected
courtrooms–including monitors throughout the courtroom, document cameras to
display images of reports or objects, video-conferencing capabilities, and Internet
connections.6 The courtroom of Judge Kathleen M. O’Malley in the Northern
District of Ohio was included in this experiment and, at the time, became “touted as

2

E-mail from Christopher Evers, elbow clerk for Judge Gwin, to Nicole De Sario, author
(April 22, 2002) (on file with author) [hereinafter Evers e-mail].
3
EFFECTIVE USE OF COURTROOM TECHNOLOGY: A JUDGE’S GUIDE TO PRETRIAL AND TRIAL
56 (Federal Judicial Center and National Institute for Trial Advocacy eds., 2001) (on file with
author) [hereinafter JUDGE’S GUIDE].
4

Id.

5

Id. at 56-57.

6

Pamphlet, supra note 1; see infra, Section II.
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the most technologically advanced courtroom in existence.”7 The courtroom
technology was deemed a success after studies showed that it helped increase
expediency,8 cut costs,9 and improved jury retention.10 A report by the Judicial
Conference of the United States, the judiciary’s policy-making body, found that
“[u]se of automation and technology allows the judiciary to handle a continuously
growing workload while, at the same time, minimizing overall spending increases
and maintaining services to the public.” 11 Specifically, the Economy Subcommittee
of the Judicial Conference found that the equipment would lower future increases in
paper, postage, and travel.12
Consequently, in March of 1999, the Judicial Conference, recommended that
courtroom technologies must be considered as “necessary and integral parts of the
courtrooms undergoing construction or major renovation.”13
As such, the
Administrative Office set aside some of its Congressional funds for technology.14
The Judicial Conference also declared the importance of retrofitting technologies
into existing courtrooms, although such courtrooms would not be given priority with
funding.15
Akron Courtroom 575 was one courtroom that qualified for the funds as a new
courtroom being built. By June of 2000,16 the Electronic Courtroom was complete,
leading a national effort to expand the availability of such technology. To date, fiftythree out of ninety-seven U.S. districts have at least one courtroom that with
evidence presentation equipment, and sixty-nine districts have at least one courtroom
with proper equipment for video-conferencing.17 These impressive numbers will
only continue to grow until Electronic Courtrooms become the norm. The
Honorable James S. Gwin, the judge presiding over Akron Courtroom 575,
explained: “A lot of courts are going to this technology, so the legal issues that play
out will play out all over.”18
7

Id.

8

Id. (“The landmark project demonstrated the successful integration of technology and
justice as the District addressed the challenge of ever-increasing caseloads.” Id.)
9
Report to Congress on the Optimal Utilization of Judicial Resources, “Achieving Savings
and Efficiencies through Automation and Technology,” 57-68, (1998), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/library.html [hereinafter Report to Congress].
10

Courtroom Technology Draws Positive Response, THE THIRD BRANCH (Admin. Office of
the U.S. Courts), Aug. 1998, at 9.
11

Report to Congress, supra note 9, at 57.

12

Id.

13

JUDGE’S GUIDE, supra note 3, at 304 (emphasis added).

14

Id.

15

Id.

16

See Evers e-mail, supra note 2.

17

JUDGE’S GUIDE, supra note 3, at 287-89 (data compilations by author).

18

Interview with Judge James S. Gwin, Federal Judge, Northern District of Ohio in Akron,
Ohio (March 27, 2002) [hereinafter Gwin interview].
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II. THE ELECTRONIC COURTROOM: CASE STUDY OF COURTROOM 575
A. Description of the Equipment
Akron Courtroom 575, located in the heart of a federal district where Electronic
Courtrooms began and continue to flourish, is a model of how such courtrooms
function. Upon entering the courtroom, the most visible signs of innovative
technology are the sixteen flat panel monitors spread throughout the courtroom. The
monitors are placed discretely to preserve the decorum of the courtroom. Eight
fifteen inch screens are neatly hidden in the jury box. Flat panel video displays are
also placed near the seats of the court reporter, deputy clerk, judge, testifying
witness, and opposing lawyers (one at each table and a third at the lectern).
Meanwhile, one large screen hangs to the left of the jury box, which allows the
public to view the display. Touch screen panels appear along the sides of the
monitors for the judge, the lawyer at the lectern, and the testifying witness, allowing
them to control features of the system. The judge has ultimate control over what is
shown on the screens, and has sole access to a “Kill Video” switch, which blanks the
screens for the jurors as well as the main screen.19 The Judge’s Guide notes that
judges typically use this control when an objection is interposed.20
Each monitor is connected through the DEPS. “The DEPS allows counsel to
switch from displaying exhibits, realtime transcripts, video recording or multi-media
presentations with the push of a button.”21 One can imagine how the monitor may
function as a computer screen for a computerized power-point presentation or a
television screen to show a video tape. Nevertheless, more explanation is needed
about how the monitors display realtime transcripts and exhibits.
Realtime court reporting describes a computer program that automatically
translates the shorthand of the court reporters into readable text and disperses the
information to the monitors that subscribe to the service.22 Because Akron
Courtroom 575 purchases the service from the courtroom reporters (who are
independent contractors), both the judge and the jury have access to the text.23 If a
juror is hearing impaired, the judge, who has control over all of the monitors in the
courtroom, can arranges to have the realtime text appear on a monitor in front of the
juror.24 Additionally, infrared listening assistance and translation capabilities are
available to jurors through the technology.25 Meanwhile, the judge always has
access to the realtime transcripts through his monitor, allowing him to read spoken
19

JUDGE’S GUIDE, supra note 3, at 17.

20

Id. at 17. Note: While other judges have made use of this kill video switch, Judge Gwin
has not. Instead, he uses the “pink noise system,” which stops the noise of the presentation.
See infra note 24.
21

Pamphlet, supra note 1.

22

JUDGE’S GUIDE, supra note 3, at 29-30.

23

Interview with Christopher Evers, elbow clerk to Judge James S. Gwin, in Akron, Ohio
(March 27, 2002) [hereinafter Evers interview].
24

Gwin interview, supra note 18.

25

Id.
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words just moments after delivery. If an objection is made, the judge can quickly
read the statements in dispute. Lawyers are not automatically included in the court’s
realtime reporting contract, but may choose to subscribe to the service.26
Exhibits can also be displayed on the monitors through the use of the evidence
camera (sometimes called the “exhibit camera”).27 The evidence camera, resting
next to the lectern, is the technological successor to the overhead projector.28 It
lights the object placed from below, records the image through a small, cordless
video camera from above, and transmits the image to the monitors. With this device,
both documents and small objects can be displayed. Furthermore, the camera can be
used to zoom in on relevant aspects of objects or photographs.29
The evidence camera is placed on an integrated lectern, which facilitates the
lawyer’s use of the equipment. This special lectern keeps all of the relevant
technology conveniently close to the lawyer, with side wings for holding an evidence
camera and a monitor, an Internet connection for a laptop placed on top the lectern,
and a storage space below for a VCR.30 With the flick of a hand, the lawyer can
place an item on the evidence camera for the court to view and then turn to the
monitor and, using a fingertip, draw an arrow to portions of a document, or circle
relevant areas.31 These markings appear on all of the monitors, effectively
superimposed over the original display. This capability can be understood as the
electronic equivalent of a dry-erase marker.32 Once the markings are complete, a
color video printer, when necessary, keeps a record of the annotated document by
printing out a photo-sized copy of the image and annotations on the screen.33
In addition to the uses described above, the monitors may also facilitate videoconferencing. This function is used when a witness is unable to travel to the
courtroom and instead appears on the screens through a video camera. The
courtroom screens display a headshot of the witness, while off-location the witness’s
screen displays an image of the attorney.34 Consequently, the witness participating
in the video-conferencing is not given a view of the judge or the jury during the
proceedings (although the witness can hear the judge’s voice).35 During objections,
when the judge does not believe it is appropriate for the jurors to be observing the
witness, he may blank the screens using his “Kill Video” switch.36 Such technology
26

Evers interview, supra note 23.

27

JUDGE’S GUIDE, supra note 3, at 7.

28

Id.

29

Evers interview, supra note 23.

30

JUDGE’S GUIDE, supra note 3, at 24.

31

Id.

32

Evers interview, supra note 23.

33

JUDGE’S GUIDE, supra note 3, at 15.

34

Id.

35

Evers interview, supra note 23; JUDGE’S GUIDE, supra note 3, at 27.

36

Evers interview, supra note 23.
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reduces travel costs37 and facilitates the testimony of individuals who are not
physically mobile, such as prisoners. During the recent case of Austin v. Wilkinson,38
Judge Gwin used the technology to hear testimony from prisoners on days that he did
not set up court in prison.39
Finally, hidden in the panels of the courtroom is the infrastructure for Internet
connections and a special sound system – two technological capabilities said to help
improve factual and legal accuracy during a trial.40 Internet connections are placed at
the judge’s bench, at counsel’s tables, and at the lectern. Judge Gwin explains that
the Internet capabilities have allowed him, on the spot, to correct lawyers who have
mischaracterized cases because he is able to read the case in question via the
Internet.41 Meanwhile, the infrared listening devices allow jurors to use headphones
to better hear recordings or witness testimony. Judge Gwin uses this capability up to
five times a year when he presides over narcotics cases that require the jury to screen
tape recordings of an F.B.I. agent’s wiretap.42 The judge notes that there is a marked
improvement in sound using the headphones, allowing the jury to better understand
what is being said.43
B. Merging Technology with Justice: How the Equipment Affects the Trial
In addition to the impacts mentioned above, Judge Gwin has observed three ways
in which technology has affected trials in his courtroom: (1) it has helped him
proceed on an expedited schedule that has reduced his caseload to one third of its
original size; (2) it tends to improve the jury’s ability to understand and retain
information, and (3) it has evened the playing field for counsel, who once utilized
such technology only if their client had very deep pockets.44
Before becoming a federal judge, Judge Gwin served for nine years as an Ohio
general division judge and presided over approximately 450 jury trials.45 This
experience, coupled with his five years serving as a federal judge, has allowed Judge
Gwin to make observations about the impact of the technology on a trial. “After all
those trials, I have some fairly strong opinions about what works and what does not

37

Report to Congress, supra note 9, at 57.

38

189 F. Supp. 2d 719 (N.D. Ohio 2002).

39

Gwin interview, supra note 18.

40

Id.

41

Id.

42
E-mail from Judge James S. Gwin, Federal Judge, Northern District of Ohio, to Nicole
De Sario, author (Sept. 16, 2002) (on file with author) [hereinafter Gwin e-mail Sept. 16].
43

Id.

44

Id.

45

Id.
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work.”46 From the judge’s perspective, this technology is a success, justifying the
investment made by the Administrative Office.47
Judge Gwin explains that the technology “makes the case significantly faster.”48
There is no shuffling of papers.49 Lawyers can impeach from the lectern (using the
evidence camera), and jurors can simultaneously observe evidence through their
monitors.50 The Electronic Courtroom reduces timely set-ups, such as rolling in a
VCR or fumbling with a three-legged easel.51 The use of the equipment is not
mandatory, although some judges use their discretion to require use of the
technology in cases involving many exhibits and documents.52 In Judge Gwin’s
courtroom, the lawyers choose to use the equipment.53 Even a lawyer who is not
already familiar with the equipment quickly becomes adept by attending a training
session.54 Judge Gwin’s former clerk, Christopher Evers, who used to conduct the
trainings, explained that even lawyers, who initially announced to the jury that they
would give a simple presentation without many gadgets, soon found themselves
making use of the equipment due to its convenience.55
Lawyers have incentives to use the technology given favorable jury reactions.
After trials are over, jurors often tell Judge Gwin that the visual displays on the
monitors makes it easier to remember what transpired during the trial.56 Such
reactions are in accord with scientific studies about how sensory perceptions
function:
Research shows that the use of visual aids to assist with an oral
presentation can facilitate comprehension, increase understanding and
retention levels by as much as sixty-five percent. Additionally,
information which is perceived by the individual from a variety of
methods (aural, visual, and written) is retained and understood at a
substantially higher level.57

46

E-mail from Judge James S. Gwin, Federal Judge, Northern District of Ohio, to Nicole
De Sario, author (Apr. 25, 2002) (on file with author) [hereinafter Gwin e-mail Apr. 25].
47

Id.

48

Gwin interview, supra note 18.

49

Id.

50

Id.

51

Id.

52

JUDGE’S GUIDE, supra note 3, at 15.

53

Id.

54

Evers interview, supra note 23.

55

Id.

56

Gwin interview, supra note 18.

57
Karen D. Butera, Seeing is Believing: A Practitioner’s Guide to the Admissibility of
Demonstrative Computer Evidence, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 511, 513 (1998).
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The Administrative Office of the U.S Courts tested this theory in the Electronic
Courtroom by presenting the same trial to two panels; one that used the technology,
and another that did not.58 The jurors were tested for their recollection of testimony
several weeks later.59 These jurors recalled more when they had the materials
presented through the technologically wired courtroom.60 Judge Gwin explained that
“[j]urors who are able to see the exhibit being referred to are much better at
following the evidence. And the case moves much faster without the shuffling of
papers between examining attorney and witness. Much crisper presentations.”61
Judge Gwin is currently in the process of planning a similar experiment within
Akron Courtroom 575.62
As trial matters become more complex, courtroom technology may be an
effective tool for communicating difficult concepts:
Over the last few decades, courts have dealt with injuries and
infringements stemming from intricate, complex products such as
artificial heart valves and their parts, pesticides, asbestos, breast implants,
and computer chips . . . [Technological exhibits] are not solely being
introduced to add “sparkle” to cases, or “entertain” or even “dazzle”
easily-bored jurors, as much as they are simply necessary to explain the
complexities of the case so that the jury can understand the factual issues
involved before they attempt the more difficult task of determining how to
resolve the challenging factual disputes.63
If technology can result in increased jury retention and comprehension, one must
question the fairness of concentrating these benefits among only the wealthiest of
clients. “As technology began to appear in more and more courtrooms, many
lawyers and judges were concerned about the David vs. Goliath situation in which
the financial resources of one side might weigh too heavily on the outcome of the
trial.”64 Electronic Courtrooms address this problem by evenly distributing access to
technology. The end result is that wealth disparities among parties are less likely to
have an unfair impact in an Electronic Courtroom
III. THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE IN THE ELECTRONIC COURTROOM
The proliferation of courtroom technology, in turn, has resulted in a plethora of
electronically-altered exhibits – raising technologically-specific questions under the
Federal Rules of Evidence. These evidentiary issues can be broken down into three
58

See Gwin interview supra note 18.

59

Id.

60

Id.

61

Gwin e-mail Sept. 16, supra note 42.

62

Gwin interview, supra note 18.

63

Fred Galves, Where the Not-So-Wild Things Are: Computers in the Courtroom, the
Federal Rules of Evidence, and the Need for Institutional Reform and More Judicial
Acceptance, 13 HARV. J. LAW & TEC 161, 168-69 (2000).
64

JUDGE’S GUIDE, supra note 3, at 49.
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categories: (1) substantive determinations if the technology violates the Federal
Rules of Evidence; (2) procedural determinations, classifying a technologicallyaltered exhibit as evidence or as an illustrative aid; and (3) discretionary
determinations if technologically-altered illustrative aids should be excluded, even if
they do not conflict with the Federal Rules of Evidence.65 Given that courtroom
technology has caused a proliferation of illustrative aids, the admission of most
exhibits in the Electronic Courtroom will be left to the discretion of the presiding
judge, creating a space for new policies and procedures to be enacted.
Although “relatively little case law exists,”66 the Judge’s Guide lists common
objections that courtroom technology has raised thus far. Most of the objections that
are interposed pertain to the method of using the technology, and not the technology
itself, indicating that proper use of the equipment will allow for its successful
integration in courtrooms all over the country.67 Practitioners who become familiar
with these common objections can learn the proper use of courtroom technology and
potentially avoid violating the Federal Rules of Evidence altogether.
A. Completeness
Completeness objections are raised when one side believes they ought to be able
to supplement a document with other material, “which under Federal Evidence Rule
106, ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it.”68 Traditionally,
completeness objections applied only to “writings and recorded statements, including
audio and videotapes in lieu of transcriptions.”69 Yet, Federal Evidence Rule 611 has
been used to apply similar objections to photographs and videotape recordings.70
Rule 611(a)(1) states that the court has broad discretion to control interrogations of
witnesses to “make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment
of truth.”71 Objections are often raised under this Rule either: (1) when non-written
evidence is unfairly edited (the corollary to the 106 completeness objection for
writings); or (2) when one could argue that the limited scope of the material on direct
examination will unfairly limit cross examination (used for both written and nonwritten material).
Completeness objections are often raised by courtroom technology because
digital exhibits facilitate editing written documents, using text graphics such as

65
Id. at 3. (“Although various forms of courtroom technology have been around since the
1970s, and model courtrooms equipped with technology began appearing in law schools in
1990, little scientific research has been done in the field and relatively little case law exists.”
Id.).
66

Id.

67

FED. R. EVID. 106.

68

FED. R. EVID. 106; see also Judge’s Guide, supra note 3, at 182.

69

JUDGE’S GUIDE, supra note 3, at 182.

70

FED. R. EVID. 611(a)(1).

71

JUDGE’S GUIDE, supra note 3, at 185.
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pulled quotes, cropping photos, or presenting carefully edited videotapes in court.72
While such forms of editing preceded the introduction of new forms of technology
into the courtroom, the digital equipment facilitates the presentation of computeredited documents, which can be directly displayed on the court’s monitors. Judges
generally respond to such objections by considering if the editing would be
admissible in non-digital form.73 For example, when responding to an objection over
a pulled quote, the judge could consider that “in direct examination counsel would
not normally be allowed to approach the witness with a scissored up portion of a
paper copy of a document.”74 Often, the technology is the solution to the problem:
counsel is generally permitted to focus in on portions of a writing or photograph by
using the evidence camera, so long as they first display the complete item.75
Similarly, counsel may use the evidence camera to focus on aspects of threedimensional objects, after displaying the full object, without causing evidentiary
problems.
B. Unfairness
Unfairness concerns (Federal Evidence Rule 403) occur when an item used in
court, such as a document or photograph, has been materially altered, affecting its
message.76 While such objections may be raised simultaneously with completeness
objections, unfairness objections for digital displays generally are raised when the
content of the document is altered, as opposed to a portion of it being removed. This
objection is commonly interposed against four types of digital media in the
Electronic Courtroom.77
First, videos that can be shown with ease in an Electronic Courtroom may raise
unfairness objections. Lawyers should be aware that judges generally do not allow
the video to be played at a different speed.78 Further, lawyers should be careful
about using still frames that might unfairly characterize the video; judges are on the
alert for still frames that might be taken out of context.79
Second, unfairness objections are often raised with respect to altered margins for
documents. Although the monitors in an Electronic Courtroom have a height/width
ration of 3:4 while most documents are 8.5” x 11, lawyers should not alter the white
spaces on the document to better fit it in the screen. Doing so could raise unfairness
concerns, for example, by making a contract look denser.80
72
Id. at 186. (“Cropping has always been possible during the enlargement process with
regular photos, but digital photos are very easy to change.” )
73

JUDGE’S GUIDE, supra note 3, at 185.

74

Id.

75

Id.

76

FED. R. EVID. 403.

77

JUDGE’S GUIDE, supra note 3, at 188-196.

78

Id. at 191-92.

79

Id. at 191.

80

Id. at 188.
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Third, while digital photos are easy to work with, counsel should never use the
reshaping tool (stretching images), as judges find that this is inherently unfair.81
Further, when placing a photo on the evidence camera, lawyers should be familiar
with how to fairly adjust the iris setting and contrast. Presenting a night time photo
with the iris wide open (allowing in more light) and a high contrast can make night
images look more visible than they actually would appear at night.82 It is especially
important that opposing counsel be familiar with this effect, so they can interpose
objections. Judges are informed about this potential misuse of the evidence camera
through the aforementioned Judge’s Guide.83
Finally, lawyers may be tempted to object to fancy visual displays on fairness
grounds. Some software presentations include sounds, such as a “whoosh” when a
text graphic becomes enlarged on the screen, and visuals such as blinking lights to
highlight what is being emphasized. Nevertheless, unless the effect has a material
impact on the presentation, which is rare, a judge is unlikely to exclude the
presentation.84
C. Technology Giving Objectionable Testimony
Computerized exhibits, used in direct examination, may testify on behalf of the
witness in a way that is objectionable85 (i.e., by being leading or presenting evidence
that does not have the proper foundation). Lawyers must be careful not to display
exhibits on the monitors that have “content or markings that will lead the witness in
reciting testimony.”86 Yet, if an expert witness prepared the content of the slides to
help the jury understand the testimony, this would generally be acceptable.87 The
directing attorney must also be careful not to prematurely place a photo or document
on the evidence camera, because it may present a fact that either has not been
admitted into evidence or is not within the range of matter that the witness may
testify.88
While these are common objections to exhibits in all courtrooms, they have
heightened importance in an Electronic Courtroom, where exhibits are
simultaneously shown to the witness and the jury. As exhibits change with the press
of a button, the opposing counsel is given less time to object. Thus, it is extremely
important that the directing attorney ask the proper foundation questions, giving the
opposing attorney notice of objectionable material. Fred Galves, a scholar on the
matter, explains that when computerized exhibits are used correctly, the technology

81

JUDGE’S GUIDE, supra note 3, at 190.

82

Id.

83

Id. at 191.

84

Id. at 196.

85

Id.

86

JUDGE’S GUIDE, supra note 3, at 199. FED. R. EVID. 611.

87

Id.

88

FED. R. EVID. 602, 703.
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can minimize such objections.89 For example, instead of presenting the entirety of
exhibits, digital exhibits enable attorneys to reveal only segments of the exhibit at a
time, as they are needed, unlike the traditional easel presentations.90
IV. ILLUSTRATIVE AIDS: DISCRETION & COURTROOM TECHNOLOGY
The birth of the evidentiary issues in Electronic Courtrooms arise within the
discretionary area of illustrative aids. Courtroom technology has resulted in a
proliferation of digital, illustrative aids,91 due to the ease with which attorneys can
electronically mark, alter, and merge documents. Nevertheless, the Federal Rules of
Evidence remain centered on evidentiary material, leaving the future treatment of
courtroom technology largely to the discretion of the judge.92 While historically it
may have made sense not to promulgate standards for illustrative aids, the lack of
coherence in this area is alarming given the increasingly strong presence of
illustrative aids; they currently comprise more than half of the items shown to the
jury during the trial.93 These numbers promise to increase within Electronic
Courtrooms across the nation.94
With the shift from using chalk boards and easels to laptops and flat-panel jury
monitors, the very nature of illustrative aids has grown and changed. While such
aids have been a part of the American trial process for over 100 years, it was not
until the 1950s that trial attorneys like Melvin Belli “championed vivid, dramatic
models or charts to persuade jurors.”95 By the 1970s, the medium of presentation
shifted from chalkboards to three-legged easels.96 Originally, illustrative aids “rested
demurely in one place in the courtroom and attention was directed at them from time
to time. The circumstances dictated restraint.”97 Nevertheless, “[d]igital technology
changed all that. The new digital monitors attract and indeed demand, attention.” 98
Illustrative aids are visual displays, not offered or admitted into evidence, that
assist the jury in understanding the evidence.99 The aids, as non-evidentiary material,
generally are excluded from the jury room during deliberations.100 This does not

89

Galves, supra note 63, at 234.

90

Id.

91

JUDGE’S GUIDE, supra note 3, at 56.

92

Id. at 56-57.

93

Id. at 42.

94

With the capability to electronically alter documents, there is a proliferation of
illustrative aids in electronic courtroom. See Gwin interview, supra note 18.
95

Butera, supra note 57, at 514.

96

JUDGE’S GUIDE, supra note 3, at 58.

97

Id. at 57.

98

Id. at 57.

99

Id.

100

A judge may use his discretion in allowing the illustrative aid to enter the jury room.
See, e.g., United States v. Barefoot, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 29757 (4th Cir. 1991); see also
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mean that all computerized exhibits are kept out of the jury room. In some
Electronic Courtrooms, jurors are given a laptop computer and a disk with all of the
evidence burned onto it, so they can view the evidence in digital form.101 A
touchstone screen allows the jurors to select the evidence they wish to view, but
blocks access to illustrative aids. Other Electronic Courtrooms have allowed the jury
to return to the courtroom to have the evidence presented to them via the jury
monitors.102
Two sets of decisions by the judge determines which exhibits will be used as
illustrative aids. First, the judge must consider which exhibits can be used at all,
even if the exhibit will not be offered as evidence. For example, a judge may bar the
use of a power-point presentation in closing argument.103 Second, the judge must
determine which items to admit into evidence once an offer is made, distinguishing
between illustrative aids and demonstrative evidence. With the rise of illustrative
aids in the Electronic Courtroom, lawyers are becoming increasingly concerned
about the criteria judges invoke to make these determinations.104 “Considerable
importance attaches to the principles applied to deciding what is an evidentiary
exhibit and goes to the jury room when the jury retires and what is an illustrative aid
that is not ‘evidence’ and does not go to the jury room.”105 An exploration of this
decision-making process will reveal the need for more guidelines in this realm.
First, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not strictly extend to non-evidentiary
matters and apply to illustrative aids only by analogy.106 Thus, in determining which
illustrative aids may be used in court, the Rules are used as mere touchstones for the
judge’s exercise of discretion. The two rules most referenced, applying their policy
requirements to illustrative aids, are Rules 102 and 611(a).107 Rule 102 invites
judges to allow new forms of displays that help develop better juror understanding of
the evidence and move trials along more efficiently.108 Meanwhile, Rule 611(a)(1)
applies to compilations or charts that are not admitted into evidence under Rule
1006, requiring that the “presentation [is] effective for the ascertainment of the
truth.”109
These ambiguous Federal Evidence Rules muddy the waters in
determining how courts will treat technologically enhanced displays. For example,
the Rules give judges few benchmarks on how to apply principles of fairness to
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, 5th ed. 347 (Kenneth S. Broun, George E. Dix et al, eds., 1999).
(“The question whether a particular exhibit may be taken by the jury is widely viewed as
subject to discretionary control by the trial judge”).
101

JUDGE’S GUIDE, supra note 3, at 212-14.

102

Id.

103

Gwin interview, supra note 18.

104

JUDGE’S GUIDE, supra note 3, at 42.

105

Id.

106

Id.

107

Id.

108

Id.

109

JUDGE’S GUIDE, supra note 3, at 42.
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labels, text treatments, colors, motion, sound, positioning, intervals, and repetition in
illustrative aids. 110
Courts may use the weighing test under Federal Evidence Rule 403 to assess the
appropriateness of an illustrative aid, although not adhering strictly to its
methodology. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania referred to Rule 403 when it
found that a chart containing various adjectives and adverbs of culpability in
different sizes and colors was confusing and misleading.111 Nevertheless, the
Judge’s Guide notes that
illustrative aids can be excluded even if the prejudicial effect is not so
substantial as to reach the traditional threshold of Rule 403, because they
are supposed to be useful and cannot serve that purpose if they do not
convey information clearly without attendant distraction, unnecessary
emphasis, or needless cumulative display.112
The Sixth Circuit explained in United States v. Bray,113 that trial courts have
“discretionary authority” to exclude illustrative aids because they fail to “clarify and
simplify complex testimony or other information and evidence or to assist counsel in
the presentation of argument to the court or jury.”114
Judicial discretion extends to a second arena, determining if the illustrative aid
will be admitted into evidence and entered into the record as “demonstrative
evidence.” Demonstrative evidence is a broad category that includes all evidence
apart from tangible items that played a role in the incident in question.115 While
“substantive” or “real” evidence tends to allow jurors to rely on first-hand sensory
perceptions to assess the facts in controversy, “demonstrative evidence” gives
indirect sense impressions about what occurred.116 “The principal distinction
between the two types of evidence is that real evidence . . . is evidence that is
collected or developed during the pendency of the case. Demonstrative evidence
generally attempts to recreate or show a situation similar to facts in the case: It
illustrates the witness’s testimony.”117 Thus, demonstrative evidence includes a
photo that accurately reflects a witness’s recollection, maps relevant to establish a
geographical feature, or summary charts and diagrams to help make evidence more
understandable.118

110

Id. at 192.

111

United States v. McDade, 83 F.3d 153 (6th Cir. 1996).

112

JUDGE’S GUIDE, supra note 3, at 58.

113

139 F.3d 1104 (6th Cir. 1998)

114

Id. at 1111.

115

MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 100, at 339.

116

Don Howarth, Suzelle M. Smith, and Mary La Cesa, Rules Governing Demonstrative
Evidence at Trial: A Practitioner’s Guide, 20 W. ST. U. L. REV. 157, 158 (1992).
117

Id.

118

MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 100, at 338-39; FED. R. EVID. 1006.
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The foundation requirements for admitting demonstrative evidence are different
from those applied to real evidence. Because demonstrative evidence was not a part
of the incident in question (such as a murder weapon), there is no need for detailed
authentication, proving that the object in court was actually the object involved in the
matter.119 Instead, the foundation is simply based on the evidence’s helpfulness in
aiding the trier of fact to better understand or evaluate the substantive evidence.120
While helpfulness to the witness may be a relevant factor in determining if the
exhibit may be used in court as an illustrative aid, only helpfulness to the jury is
relevant in determining if the aid should be admitted as evidence.121 There are three
criteria which set the floor, but not the ceiling, for determining if an item may be
admitted as demonstrative evidence.122 First, if the proffered evidence is to illustrate
witness testimony, the witness must be familiar with it.123 Second, the evidence must
fairly and accurately reflect the other evidence to which it relates.124 Third, the
evidence must be relevant. 125 These criterion create the per se rule that, if one of
these factors is not met, the evidence would not be helpful to the trier of fact.126
Nevertheless, judges may use their discretion to rule, on other grounds, that the
display should not be admitted as demonstrative evidence because it will not
sufficiently aid the trier of fact.127
In the Electronic Courtroom, judicial discretion is often exercised to determine if
the use of the equipment results in an acceptable illustrative aid or demonstrative
evidence. Such questions are presented when considering a power point presentation
used in summation and the images printed on the court’s color video printers (which
print a copy of the display on the monitor along with the lawyer’s colored
119

MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 100, at 338-39.

120

Howarth, supra note 116, at 158.

121

Id.

122

See Howarth, supra note 116, at 157.

123

Id.

124

See, e.g., Sanchez v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 538 F.2d 304, 306 n.1 (10th
Cir. 1976) (noting that party must lay foundation of accuracy and fairness for motion picture
exhibit); see also United States v. Myers, 972 F.2d 1566, 1579 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting that
admissibility turns on whether there is foundation testimony that demonstrative evidence is a
“fair” and “accurate” depiction of original.).
125

These criteria are listed in much of scholarly literature as four separate prongs: (1)
usefulness to the trier of fact; (2) witness familiarity with the evidence; (3) relevance; and (4)
accuracy. See, e.g., Howarth, supra note 116, at 157; Butera, supra note 57, at 515. The first
one is listed separately given that the other three factors are all methods of assessing the
usefulness of the evidence.
126

Id.

127

“A district court has broad discretion in deciding evidentiary matters including the
admissibility of experiments. Accordingly, we will not disturb the court’s decision unless we
have a definite and firm conviction it made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds
of permissible choice in the circumstances.” Pandit v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 82 F.3d 376,
381 (10th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
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annotations). As courtroom technology becomes more prevalent, one can only
marvel at its potential uses. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that such technology will be
integrated smoothly into the judicial arena when each individual judge serves as an
idiosyncratic referee, determining which uses of the technology will be acceptable
and which will not. With the Judicial Conference lobbying for the increased funding
of Electronic Courtrooms,128 in addition to studies that have shown its benefits,129 the
stage is set for more developed evidentiary standards. Legal scholars ought to work
to introduce rules that clarify the permissible uses of technology, making predictable
the types of uses that create acceptable illustrative aids and, in turn, the types of
technological aids that will be admitted into the record.
V. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF COURTROOM TECHNOLOGY
In the upcoming years, many jurors will share in the technological experience of
those who sit in Akron Courtroom 575. The trial will unfold on the monitors in the
jury box and, during summation, the jurors will learn by watching a power point
presentation why they should hand down a certain verdict. With nearly half of the
United States District Courts employing such technology in one of its courtrooms130
and with funding for outfitting new courtrooms,131 legal discourse must focus on how
to prepare for the era of Electronic Courtrooms. Given the benefits of expediency,
accuracy and jury retention,132 legal uncertainty in this area should not be allowed to
chill the use of these innovations. The area of law most affected by this
technological development is the Federal Rules of Evidence. Through continued
discourse and studies, the Rules must be expanded to address the Electronic
Courtroom and the rising importance of illustrative.
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